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Abstract  
The goal of enhancing science-industry cooperation with the aim to boost 
countries’ innovation performance has been a part of various development 
strategies in European countries for quite some time and an array of incentives is 
targeted at elements of national innovation systems in order to facilitate 
university technology transfer. This paper aims to discuss these incentives in 
Latvia - a small country in transition, with a relatively poor innovation 
performance and with a pressure to shape its industrial and research policies 
towards industrial development and sustainable growth. Latvia is a country still 
recovering from the recent financial crisis and trying to overcome the problems 
of the past when it was a part of the Soviet Union - a background that gives 
specific characteristics for the environment in which researchers and firms 
operate. This paper focuses on the chosen policy mix and incentives for 
supporting science-industry linkages in Latvia and how it matches the structure 
of the economy. We suggest that the chosen approach (which is more often than 
not inspired by foreign success stories) fails and causes a mismatch between both 
realms and thus slows down the improvement as it tries to address not the causes 
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of low cooperation such as business sector’s low innovation absorption capacity 
that impacts technology transfer processes in a significant way, but instead 
alleviates the symptoms e.g. low R&D expenditure. We use case study approach, 
relying on desk research, interviews with key policy makers as our data sources. 
Keywords: University technology transfer, research and industrial policy, 
innovation absorption, policy transfer, policy failure  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Knowledge and technology transfer activities are considered an 
important driver of innovation performance and need to be looked at when a 
country aims to improve this performance (Calcagnini & Favaretto, 2015).Thus, 
it is no surprise that a vast amount of literature is dedicated to the topic. In the 
US, the issue of technology transfer and university-industry collaboration became 
increasingly contested during the late 1970s to 1980s, in part for political reasons, 
but also due to concerns about the country’s competitive advantage in the 
increasingly global marketplace (Grimaldi, Kenney, Siegel, & Wright, 2011; 
Mowery, Nelson, Sampat, & Ziedonis, 2004). In a similar fashion, the debate 
about necessary incentives to support technology transfer and science-industry 
collaboration has intensified in the European Union over the last decade. The 
worst performing Member States of the EU now face significant pressure to 
improve performance in these activities. To counter the apparent 
malperformance, governments have been developing and implementing reforms 
to establish well-balanced innovation systems within their countries, including 
university reforms to improve technology transfer (Calcagnini & Favaretto, 2015; 
Goldfarb & Henrekson, 2003). 
However, in some cases it has been a challenge stretching out for more 
than two decades and still ongoing. One of such cases is Latvia – a post-Soviet 
country who restored its independence in 1991. Same as for some other Central 
and Eastern European (CEE) EU member states, there is still a long way for 
Latvia to catch up on countries that are European innovation leaders – Denmark, 
Sweden, Finland and Germany (European Commission, 2015). When looking for 
solutions, policy makers often rely on case studies of best examples from the 
universities in the U.S. and the aforementioned European innovation leaders. 
However, the best practice examples from the innovation frontrunners are not that 
easy to implement. At the same time, government incentives (or lack of thereof) 
in countries with poor innovation performance is not as widely discussed and 
explored for policy making purposes. Additionally, while there is literature 
discussing knowledge and technology transfer activities as such, considerably 
less literature touches upon various policy instruments that the governments 
could exploit to support these activities and how the specific support initiatives 
are designed at government level (Rasmussen, 2008). Therefore, we intend to 
cover this gap in the literature.  
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One explanation for the relative weakness of innovation performance in 
Latvia is the weakness of its institutions – both formal and informal – largely 
being the result of transition. However, to explain the somewhat weak 
performance in terms of technology transfer, one has to look at the source of 
funds for R&D and innovation, which currently plays a very significant role. In 
many of the CEE countries with weak innovation performance, private sector 
R&D spending is lagging behind public investment. At the same time a 
substantial part of public investment in some countries, including Latvia, comes 
from European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF). ESIF funds, however, 
have their own constraints, such as greater bureaucracy if compared with national 
funding, as well as limitations to commercial exploitation due to incorrect 
application of state aid regulation. Therefore, this paper aims to contribute to the 
discussion on university technology transfer of publicly funded research results. 
We also discuss ways to improve innovation performance in countries in 
transition by discussing the experience of Latvia - a small country with relatively 
low R&D spending both in absolute and relative terms (0.68% of GDP in 2014) 
and a historical background that continues to influence the economy resulting in 
low innovation absorption capacity among other things. Despite implementing 
major structural changes the question whether they have been successful is still 
relevant for Latvia even after a decade within the EU. 
The paper provides a case study of government incentives in Latvia that 
are aimed at fostering science-industry linkages and university technology 
transfer. The second section looks at the historical background and structural 
changes that impacted and continues to shape the national innovation system 
significantly as well as the current situation. The third section discusses the types 
of support programs, their management on a government and also university 
level. The fourth section evaluates and how well the chosen policy mix matches 
the circumstances, while the conclusions are discussed in the fifth section. 
 
2. R&D ENVIRONMENT AND INNOVATION SYSTEM 
IN LATVIA 
2.1. Latvian R&D during the Soviet era and the transition period 
The roots of current issues within the national innovation system and the 
problems related to insufficient science-industry linkages in Latvia stretch all the 
way back to the time when it was a part of the Soviet Union and the subsequent 
transition period. Because of these events numerous radical changes in the 
innovation system have occurred and that has left a negative effect on the 
country's innovation performance. 
During the Soviet period Latvia was a part of a massive, inflexible, 
inefficient and fragmented system without a central overview and efficient 
coordination (Rambaka, 2012). The system that Latvia was a part of spanned the 
entire Soviet Union meaning that various processes were often dispersed both 
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organisation and location wise. It could particularly well be seen by looking at 
elements of the innovation system - basic research, fuelled by military-driven 
competition, was connected to the military but not accessible for civil 
applications due to secrecy issues and was conducted by the Academy of 
Sciences, the main decision making body in the USSR when it comes to R&D. 
Applied research was linked to branch institutes and industrial sector. The area 
that was under pressure from foreign competitors was the military sector. 
Meanwhile, as Egorov and Carayannis (1999) discuss, many specialists were 
concentrated in traditional sectors with low potential for innovation and this 
heritage has also influenced Latvia’s innovation performance in years after. 
Latvia specialised in areas like mechanical and electrical engineering, metallurgy, 
chemicals, timber, textiles and food processing industries - industries that were 
areas of specialisation for Latvia already during the interwar period. Latvia had 
strong industrial research capacities (European Commission, 1999) and despite 
the overall system being inefficient, scientific achievements were still made in 
both fundamental and applied research and the Baltic region even was one of few 
regions in the USSR that commercialised research results, thus attracting foreign 
investments (Kristapsons, Dagyte, & Martinson, 2003).  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Latvia restored its independence 
in 1991, inducing radical changes in all spheres with a complete restructuring of 
the economy. Once again, Latvia almost instantly found itself without the 
previously accessible markets – the previous time was when Latvia was first 
established as an independent state in 1918. Given that peculiar distribution of 
industrial/applied research in the Soviet Union, where industrial research was 
performed by dedicated research institutes often serving the needs of industry 
located in other Soviet republics, after the collapse of the Soviet Union Latvia 
found itself with excess R&D capacity, which could not be utilised by local 
industry alone. A similar situation was in the industry more generally, which 
found itself cut off from its core trade partners. And just as in the 1920s, 
establishing access to other now missing parts of value chain, such as raw 
materials and energy supplied from other parts of the Soviet Union, was 
important. Meanwhile, a decision to continue the support for the enterprises 
basically meant turning them into burdens for the country as they were unable to 
respond to the new demands of the market economy. Thus, as markets dwindled, 
so did the industries were Latvia had specialised. Similarly, the research sector 
had to adjust to different funding approach, since no elements of competition 
were present previously.  
After initial collapse in the early 1990s, manufacturing industry started 
to recover after 1996, however, industry was being gradually substituted with 
services, as the main economic sector. Besides, most of the industry with 
relatively high value added – the only natural partner for R&D and technology 
transfer, was declining at a faster pace, initially due to demand shock, but later 
due to the so-called Vanek-Reinert effect (Kattel, Reinert, & Suurna, 2009). 
Given that Latvian government from early on decided to rely on liberal economic 
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policies, and due to budgetary constraints, no substantial support was provided to 
stabilise and support industry in Latvia. In its report European Commission(1999) 
particularly pointed out the largest pharmaceutical company in Latvia Grindex 
who did not at the time receive support from the government to improve business 
although an R&D intensive company would have been highly favoured by a 
Western government. 
Main policy measures focused on providing basic “life support” to the 
science and research system as well as integrating research with higher education 
and linking researchers with existing needs. Another step that needed to be taken 
was development of a system for research funding that would provide at least the 
bare minimum horizontally across all filed of science and research.  
Because of the planned accession to the EU, it was necessary to direct 
R&D towards European and national priorities and the first priorities were indeed 
set in 1997 (Cabinet of Ministers defined priority research fields with the aim of 
establishing National Research Centres). As no decisions regarding specialization 
in certain domains in science were made at the time, the priority areas were very 
broad and inclusive. As many companies and institutes became autonomous, 
were downsized and in many occasions divided into smaller establishments, the 
innovation system became very fragmented. Besides, it had very limited funding 
which was not focused on specific areas in order to get the critical mass necessary 
to produce high level research outputs, industrial R&D capabilities, the capacity 
of companies to absorb innovation was reduced (Kristapsons et al., 2003). These 
characteristics led to challenges to implement coordinated activities and a unified 
research policy and have influenced science-industry linkages even until this day. 
Universities and institutes face insufficient R&D funding from the industrial 
sector as during the early transition years the links between industry and science 
were broken, research institutions became heavily dependent on state budgets, 
international co-operation and funding from the EU in form of research grants 
became a second source of income (European Commission, 1999). There was 
some development in terms of support for basic research while applied research 
was somewhat left behind due to insufficient coordination between the Ministry 
of Education and Science (MoES) and the Ministry of Economics (ME). Up until 
now, university technology transfer lacks significant results for a number of 
reasons. First, many companies are reluctant to cooperate because of the 
bureaucratic funding mechanisms and uncertainty of commercial benefits from 
investing in R&D among other factors. Second, most of the companies lack the 
absorptive capacity necessary for uptake of research results produced by 
universities and research institutions.  
 
2.2. Current R&D and innovation environment in Latvia 
According to the Innovation Union Scoreboard 2015 (IUS), Latvia’s 
overall innovation performance has been ranked the third worst among the EU 
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member and despite the efforts of Latvian policy makers to include support for 
innovation in national development strategies. In fact, as Veugelers has argued in 
a recent paper (2015), the divide between top performers and laggards has been 
increasing in the EU, where Latvia’s innovation performance is just 30 per cent of 
that of the innovation leaders.  
Strategies, reports, assessments and evaluations done by either local 
ministries or by foreign experts list many causes for this poor performance, such 
as a fragmented national innovation system, very little funding for research, lack 
of cooperation and significant under-investment in research from the industrial 
sector, lack of commitment from the policy makers among others (Arnold et al., 
2014; MoES, 2013; Smidova, 2015). The problems and causes of the insufficient 
performance are not really that different from those identified early in the 
transition period by the Danish Research Council (1992) and later by the 
European Commission (1999). Data on R&D expenditure over the last 15 years 
suggests that the commitment from both private and public sector to R&D has not 
sufficiently improved. Fluctuations of Gross domestic expenditure on R&D since 
2010 are shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1 Gross domestic expenditure on R&D, 2000-2012, % of GDP 
Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia (CSB, 2015) 
 
Total R&D expenditure in 2014 reached 0.68% of GDP, despite the Law on 
Scientific Activity (in force from 2005) that states an increase in funding should be at 
least 0.15% of the GDP on an annual basis until it reaches 1%. However, innovation 
policy has not really been among the top government priorities – the government 
doesn’t have a long term strategic plan, but is constantly engaged in trying to solve 
urgent matters instead. This could be seen when the crisis hit and the budget for R&D 
was one of the first things that were cut and also now – investments in R&D keep 
fluctuating despite understanding the need to increase it. 
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The data in Figure 2 show that over time the funds available through 
various EU programmes have to some extent replaced government funding - total 
funding for R&D by foreign countries accounted for some 0.30% of GDP in 
2014. This is a not a positive trend as the research system should be able to 
sustain itself when the funds eventually run out.  
 
 
Figure 2 Expenditure on R&D by sector, 2000-2012, mln euro 
Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia 
 
Latvia’s innovation performance has fluctuated over time. According to the 
IUS(European Commission, 2015), Latvia is a modest innovator but shows signs of 
improvement and has recently become a leader in innovation growth. However, 
Latvia’s innovation performance still is below the EU average for most indicators 
measured by the IUS. Data also shows that in both 2014 and 2015, indicators most 
important for fostering technology transfer - R&D expenditures in the business sector 
and public-private scientific co-publications– were among the lowest (European 
Commission, 2014, 2015). Given that co-authored publications are often an outcome 
of partnerships or associated interactions, low levels of co-authored publications point 
to the low level of absorptive capacity of Latvian enterprises (OECD, 2013). 
Although private sector’s R&D expenditure overall has increased since 2000, the 
amount of investments has been fluctuating (showing a significant decline from 2006) 
and remains very low, especially when compared to the more advanced EU countries. 
This suggests that the rate of cooperation and absorptive capacity needs to be 
improved in order to integrate state-of-the-art knowledge and technology in the 
companies’ operations.  
The economic development so far has been based on low labour costs and 
low tech industries, while absorptive capacity of industry has not increased 
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significantly (Arnold et al., 2014; Klāsons & Spuriņš, 2015). Arnold et al. (2014) also 
pointed out that the cluster formation in Latvia is weak and that does not encourage 
sharing of expertise and infrastructure among the companies, hindering ability to 
innovate and absorb innovation and build advantages of specialization. The majority 
of companies in Latvia are small and medium sized enterprises (most of which are 
effectively micro-enterprises or self-employed people) with limited financial and 
human resources for innovation that limits the capability to acquire knowledge and 
technology from R&D institutions and there also seems to be insufficient motivation 
for that. 
As Rodriquez-Pose (2001) argued, in the less developed regions it is 
prevalence of SMEs, limited supply of skilled workforce, as well as relatively low 
levels of entrepreneurship that hinder practical application of academic research 
results, thus constraining the possible positive effects of public investment in research 
on innovation and economic development.  
Additionally, the Commission Country Report (European Commission, 
1999)suggested that Latvian companies might face additional challenges due to 
uneven distribution of research infrastructure in regions as  most of it is concentrated 
in the capital city Riga. A more recent study on business activity in different regions 
in Latvia (Klāsons & Spuriņš, 2015) argued that only 4% of the companies would 
consider changing their location to be in closer proximity of R&D infrastructure, thus 
suggesting that they are not oriented towards technological innovation or interested in 
collaboration with research organisations. 
According to a survey carried out by the Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia 
(CSB, 2014), while majority of innovative companies have developed technological 
innovations, most of the funds are directed to infrastructure improvements - almost 
94% of expenditure went to acquisition of modern equipment or software in 2012. 
Only 1% of total innovation expenditure was directed to R&D outsourcing, and 3% to 
in-house R&D activities. In addition, the results of the survey show that only every 
fourth company cooperated with someone else in innovation activities - the 
cooperation partners were most likely other companies or providers of components, 
softwareetc., while the least likely partner was higher education or research 
institutions. Despite investments, most of the companies, with a few exceptions still 
rely on outdated infrastructure and equipment, which makes investment in 
infrastructure paramount to retain competitiveness in the export markets. This pattern 
of investment and collaboration also suggests that the dominant pattern of innovation 
in Latvian companies is process innovation. As process innovation is learning-by-
doing, using and interacting (DUI) type rather than science and technology-based 
innovation, formal technology transfer through acquisition of patents, etc. is suitable 
only for a small number of companies that operate in knowledge intensive sectors 
such as IT, electronics and pharmaceuticals, while for the rest of the economy it has 
little to offer. 
Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia (CSB, 2015) identified 411 companies 
engaged in R&D in 2014, while the amount or R&D workers was 1382 – 776 R&D 
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personnel (researchers) in full time equivalent, 606 other R&D staff (technicians and 
equivalent staff and research supporting staff). Although the number has increased 
significantly comparing to 2013, the proportion of R&D workers in the business 
sector is very low and the data still suggests problems with human resources and a 
shortage in human resources skilled in areas important for technological innovation - 
possible reason for low innovation absorption capacity. 
However, the data on company R&D performance and staff might be 
imprecise and might be misleading and showing a more optimistic picture, but, as 
we can see now, not accounting for some innovation. After all the labor force has 
been declining, while the GDP has been growing since 2010, which means that 
there are at least some innovations, if not technological, then some 
process/managerial, taking place. The reason for this is the reporting on company 
innovation activities that has been rather poor until very recently – when the 
R&D tax incentive was introduced – there was no formal incentive for most 
companies to account for R&D and report it. The only exception might be 
companies with significant share of foreign capital, where accounting standards 
are higher and therefore also R&D expenditure is also accounted for. 
 
2.3. Governance of research and innovation policy 
Meanwhile the science sector is highly dependent on EU funding (that 
has to a large extent replaced state funding) and therefore has focused its efforts 
on activities aimed as acquiring research funding and not necessarily addressing 
market demands.  R&D institutions are fragmented and that has negatively 
affected the distribution of funding. Additional challenge for bringing this 
fragmented system together is the fragmentation of innovation policy making and 
implementation across a number of organisations, which is further exacerbated by 
weak coordination between ministries and in general weak and fragmented 
governance structures for research and innovation. 
The Law on Scientific Activity determines that the Cabinet of Ministers 
sets the policy for science and technology, however the Cabinet is only involved 
as the formal decision making body. The Latvian Strategic Council for Research 
and Innovation, a collegial body under the cabinet created to facilitate cross-
sectoral coordination in research and innovation policy, so far has not been 
effective in providing strategic guidance, as it failed to attract political decision 
makers. The Latvian Council of Science, whose role in the early transition years 
was more significant and was that of an advisory body, has in the recent years 
become more of a funding agency under the Ministry of Education and Science 
(further - MoES). MoES, on the other hand, has gained a very significant role as 
the developer and coordinator of science and technology policy since the 
Academy of Sciences lost its position as a policy making body (Rambaka, 2012). 
Innovation policy, however, is the responsibility of MoE with its own funding 
agency - Investment and Development Agency of Latvia (further - LIAA). Both 
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LIAA and the Latvian Council of Science have not been established as agencies 
for funding innovation and research, but have instead evolved to fulfil this role(E. 
Arnold et al., 2014; Rambaka, 2012). However, these are not the only 
organisations involved in funding R&D or innovation - the State Education 
Development Agency (under supervision of MoES) is responsible for distributing 
and supervising funding allocated from ESIF to basic and applied research. 
Meanwhile a number of smaller organisations are in charge of managing financial 
instruments to support innovation and entrepreneurship. 
As noted above, research an innovation policy relies on horizontal 
instruments and has not sufficiently helped in focusing research, bridging science 
and industry, commercialising research outputs from research institutions. 
Fragmentation of innovation and research policy making and implementation, 
especially given the limited capacity and capabilities of individual organisations 
involved, as well as lack of priorities further exacerbate the already apparent 
inefficiencies.  
 
3. INCENTIVES FOR STRENGTHENING SCIENCE-
INDUSTRY LINKAGES 
Objectives and instruments of R&D and innovation policy are outlined 
in two documents - Science, Technology Development and Innovation Guidelines 
2014-2020 (MoES, 2013) and Guidelines on National Industrial Policy for 2014-
2020 (NIP). This yet again points to fragmentation in R&D and innovation policy 
making, as STDI Guidelines were developed by the MoES, while NIP was 
developed by the MoE. NIP focuses on promotion of innovation e.g. improving 
knowledge capacity, innovation supply, innovation demand, and the technology 
transfer system. Meanwhile, STDI Guidelines focus on national goals and 
priorities for science, technology and innovation and is a part of a strategy for 
smart specialization, as well as promotes fulfilment of the objectives defined in 
national long-term and medium-term policy planning documents (MoES, 2013). 
Funding of policy instruments included in the STDI is administered by 3 different 
organisations - the Study and Science Administration (SSA), State Education 
Development Agency (SEDA) and the Latvian Science Council (LSC) (ibid.). 
Given that innovation policy planning is directly linked to EU 7-year 
financial planning periods, all measures outlined in the policy documents for the 
current period haven’t yet been launched. In this paper we therefore focus on a set 
of instruments that were available during the previous planning period - 2007-
2013. During this period the MoES was responsible for instruments that provided 
funding for R&D, while MoE was responsible for instruments aimed at 
supporting entrepreneurship and innovation. 
Two types of support programs can be identified in Latvia, that focus on 
supporting science-industry collaboration. First, there are incentives that aim to 
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strengthen the capabilities to commercialise research via structural reforms in 
research institutions. Second, there are incentives that support applied research 
projects focused on industrial application and where commercialisation of 
research could be a possible outcome. Some of the funding for R&D was coming 
from state budget, but most instruments were funded by the ESIF. The scarcity of 
state funding prevents implementation of internal motivational instruments thus 
technology transfer is largely supported by external activities. 
To improve the conditions, universities and research institutions 
programmes like the technology transfer office (hereafter – TTO) programme 
have been implemented. The aim of the programme was to identify projects with 
an international commercialisation potential within the research organisations, 
provide support for securing intellectual property rights, provide consultations for 
both researchers and companies and provide support in technology transfer. 
Initially more activities were planned such as establishment of an overarching 
technology transfer centre that could identify projects with commercial potential 
in other organisations as well, would look over the unified IP portfolio of the 
smaller TTOs and would be as a contact point in international licencing cases, 
however, the economic crisis impacted the programme and it was decided to 
maintain the support only to the TTOs already established within research 
organisations. 
TTOs are seen by most policy makers as the centre and primary driver of 
commercialisation efforts, however, as is pointed out in some studies (Grimaldi et 
al., 2011; OECD, 2013), only a few top universities and research institutions 
across the world have meaningful income from formal commercialisation of 
research. Therefore, one could argue, that the main objective of policy makers 
when developing policy measures aimed at strengthening formal technology 
transfer is not to improve innovation performance, but to improve the country’s 
position in the Innovation Union scoreboard by improving performance in terms 
of specific indicators where country’s performance is the weakest. As a result, 
focus is more on the formal performance indicatorsand not on the real impact on 
innovation performance in enterprises. Bozeman (2000) describes this as the 
“Out-the-Door” criterion - organisations respond to external pressure by focusing 
on the number of deliverables such as cases of technology transfer while the 
impact of these cases is rarely considered. One of the reason is improvement of 
statistics that in return improve researchers’ chances of acquiring funds while in 
reality the license agreements have no significant financial value. 
An evaluation was done on the results of the TTO programme by the 
MoE (2016) and the review of their activities showed that while many of the 
quantitative indicators (national patent applications, revenue of the TTO, contract 
research) were even overachieved, they had insignificant impact on the economy. 
During the programme there were 7 cases of sale or licensing of technologies 
developed by the universities and 20 cases at the Art Academy of Latvia (sales of 
design projects) and none of them involved foreign companies. 13 spin-off 
companies were developed, on average around 1000 consultations to companies 
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or individuals were given annually. The review of the activities also states that 
TTOs were offering an important support for writing patent applications -while 
the activities and their results are important and needed, they have not visibly 
improved science-industry collaboration significantly in terms of technology 
transfer and joint ventures. Additionally, it is interesting to add that funding was 
distributed equally among TTOs, disregarding the type and capacity of the 
institutions, as well as their performance which is not motivating for the TTOs to 
achieve better results (MoE, 2016). 
Similarly, strong emphasis is put on university patenting while university 
patenting just for the sake of patenting to improve statistics, should be critically 
evaluated, as already scarce funding goes towards patent maintenance fees, while 
most of these patents are likely never to be licensed at all. 
Figure 3 shows that the number of patent applications originating from 
Latvia has increased since the 90s reaching 305 patent applications by its 
residents, 8 by foreign applicants and 174 applications by this country's resident 
at a foreign office. 
 
 
Figure 3 Patent applications from Latvia, 1999 - 2014 
Source: WIPO statistics database(WIPO, 2016) 
 
The sharp decline in non-resident filing might indicate the lack of 
interest in Latvian market, while patenting abroad suggests that local companies 
are seeking opportunities in foreign markets. However, it might also be 
misleading – as discussed above, ESIF stimulated patent applications and the 
years showing a significant increase match the years were patents were filed to 
satisfy the requirements for EU funded projects. Therefore, it does not necessarily 
indicate improvement. Even more - license and patent revenues from abroad have 
in the recent years been declining (European Commission, 2014, 2015). 
Figure 4 shows the top fields where patent applications are filed. The 
largest amount of patents is filed within the pharmaceutical, organic fine 
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chemistry and food chemistry which is not very surprising, taking into account 
the economic structure in Latvia. 
 
 
Figure 4 Patent Applications in Latvia, 2000 - 2014 
Source: WIPO statistics database (WIPO, 2016) 
 
The number of PCT applications has been steadily increasing since 
2000, however, the numbers are relatively low (Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5 PCT Applications from Latvia, 2000 - 2014 
Source: WIPO statistics database(WIPO, 2016) 
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The top PCT applicants from Latvia are “Grindeks” – the largest 
domestic pharmaceutical company, Latvian Institute of Organic Synthesis 
working mostly on drug discovery and development, and Ventspils University 
College. While pharmaceuticals is the field where the most patent applications are 
filed, the companies in Latvia are focusing mostly on producing generic rather 
than original drugs. 
When it comes to granted patents, data available on WIPO statistics 
page, shows that the overall amount has significantly increased since the first half 
of the 2000s, especially those granted abroad.  
 
 
Figure 6 Patents granted, 2000 - 2014 
Source: WIPO statistics database (WIPO, 2016) 
 
This increase can be explained by the administrative and financial 
support from the TTOs and other incentives funded by ESIF. However, as 
mentioned previously, revenues from licensing are declining and many of the 
granted patents have found no use for the industry. 
Along with formal technology transfer by licensing, there are other 
mechanisms that universities and research institutions could use, such as 
academic spin-offs, collaborative research, contract research and consulting, as 
well as ad-hoc advice and networking with practitioners (Grimaldi et al., 2011). 
The more informal mechanisms of technology transfer are particularly relevant in 
economies with process-focused DUI mode of innovation. However, it seems that 
the Latvian government is more concentrating on supporting formal ways of 
technology transfer such as contract research and licensing. 
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The government is pressured to implement these incentives to meet the 
overall targets of the EU and success stories in other countries are being used as 
examples. However, the environment for technology transfer varies, therefore 
doing so might lead to different outcomes than expected by the policy-makers 
(Grimaldi et al., 2011). According to the OECD (2013), relative performance on 
many occasions is measured against US institutions that are widely considered to 
lead in terms of commercialisation outputs, however, as already discussed 
previously, this approach is not suitable for countries like Latvia. One of the 
reasons is the structure of businesses in Latvia –the needs of small and medium 
sized enterprises in traditional sectors often don’t match with what researchers 
can offer. For example, many research projects in Latvia are related to key 
enabling technologies (such as micro and nanoelectronics, nanotechnology, 
industrial biotechnology, advanced, materials, photonics, and advanced 
manufacturing technologies) because it gives better opportunities to acquire 
funding, however, these technologies are often too advanced and too far from the 
market to be utilised even by the local industry that represent the same field. 
Therefore, research groups later struggle to commercialise the outputs because 
there are no potential users among the local companies and infrastructure for 
technology with a higher readiness level e.g. technology development centres, 
incubators, parks, prototyping laboratories and experimental plants is not 
sufficiently developed (MoES, 2013). 
Another problem is that the complexity of the rules and regulation of 
ESIF funded projects and scarce budget make the beneficiaries very cautious in 
implementation. Therefore, research institutions seem to pay more attention to 
compliance with regulations rather than to concentrating on societal impact that 
their results could make. Although the programmes are offering new possibilities, 
such as the applied research projects, useful tools are overcomplicated thus 
reducing the positive impact they might have had. Therefore, less complicated 
implementation rules might encourage not only application for support but also 
exploitation of the results. 
While a second set of instruments helps in bringing new and better 
qualified human resources into companies(e.g. by raising the competences of 
researchers and encouraging students to purse this kind of studies), there are no 
instruments supporting company-subsidised research positions at universities and 
research institutes (MoES, 2013), as for example industrial PhD fellowships in 
Denmark or Sweden. That kind of collaboration would be beneficial for both and 
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4. POLICIES SOLVING PROBLEMS THAT DON’T 
EXIST? 
One could argue that throughout the last 15 years, Latvian decision 
makers have been copying policy instruments from more successful countries, 
assuming that those will ultimately improve Latvia’s innovation performance. 
There were, however, a number of flaws in the process that did not and still, in 
our view, do not allow to reap maximum benefits from public sector 
interventions.  
First, not enough attention has been paid to research and evaluation of 
the systemic and market failures retarding innovation and development in Latvia. 
Data collection on innovation activities of enterprises in Latvia has so far been 
limited to only a few key indicators necessary for fulfilling the EU requirements 
and no local initiatives to improve data collection have been introduced. Besides, 
collection of statistical data on innovation has not been followed by effective 
communication towards businesses regarding the needs for collection of these 
data, which ultimately negatively affects both the response rates as well as quality 
of data collected. With the introduction of tax subsidies for R&D spending, one 
could hope that at least collection of data on R&D spending will improve. 
However, given that Latvian enterprises are mostly engaged in the DUI type of 
innovation activities, most of innovative activities will still not appear in 
statistical reports. Lack of data undermines any efforts to evaluate gaps in the 
innovation system that need to be addressed via policy instruments. Therefore, if 
this will not be addressed, policy makers in Latvia will continue looking for the 
proverbial keys where there is light, and not where the keys are.  
Second, as argued elsewhere (e.g. Erik Arnold, Arnulf, Jacobsson, 
Romanainen, & Smith, 2010; Cepilovs, 2014), there is a general lack of capacity 
and capabilities in the public sector, necessary to plan, design and implement 
effective policy instruments. This is further exacerbated by high rates of turnover 
of civil servants, reaching up to 20 per cent per year (LETA, 2015). Weak 
capabilities and lacking capacity across the policy cycle lead to a situation where 
policy instruments are proposed on the basis of results of external benchmarking 
activities (for example, IUS), as well as best practices from more successful 
countries. This is not to argue that benchmarking exercises, such as IUS, are not 
useful or relevant, but should not substitute policy relevant research that feeds 
into policy practice. Normally such benchmarking exercises utilise a range of 
indicators that are universally applied across countries, disregarding the 
specificities of local environment. In case of Latvia, however, performance in a 
narrow range of indicators from IUS (e.g. R&D spending, PhD graduates, 
patenting), has served as a reference point for development of a policy mix that 
has been utilised to support innovation over the last decade, with very minor 
adjustments. This lead to a situation where solutions were chasing problems (as in 
Béland & Howlett, 2015).  
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Third, as already argued above, institutional developments that have 
taken place over the last 25 years, lead to a situation where science and research 
system has evolved in such a way as to detach itself almost entirely from the 
needs of domestic industry. While at the same time, given the effects of economic 
transition, local industry developed following a pattern persistent in many 
developing economies suffering from middle-income trap – relying on labour cost 
and not technology as a source of competitive advantage (Griffith, 2011). 
Reliance on low labour costs, resulted in low level of technological development 
across all major industries and therefore also low level of absorptive capacity 
necessary for utilisation of research output. 
We argue that besides strengthening the capacity of existing companies 
by building the competences of human resources and improving infrastructure, 
additional efforts should be made to support the creation of internationally 
oriented technology start-ups (that might be spin-offs from universities) and 
facilitating the interest of cooperation between sectors, not only by reminding the 
opportunities that innovation brings but also the dangers of not moving forwards. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
A substantial mismatch between the existing policy problems and 
applied policy instruments exists. As a result of this mismatch, most of the policy 
instruments used to support innovation, and especially so those related to 
industry-science collaboration and technology transfer through technology 
licensing, have been ineffective and failed to achieve the economic effects. The 
only objectives that could be reached if such approach to policy making is 
maintained further is improving Latvia’s position in the Innovation Union 
Scoreboard. However, this, in our view, is not likely to result in technological 
upgrading and increased competitiveness of local industry; neither will it lead to 
sustainable positive outcomes for Latvian economy, which, in our view, is the 
ultimate objective of public policy. 
Latvian policy makers are mainly applying the “Out-the-door” criterion 
when developing support incentives - the results of research that is funded by 
public money are predefined and motivates to just deliver the numbers instead of 
creating the most impact as it is not relevant for receiving the funds. What matters 
is the number of outputs written in the proposals, e.g. license agreements, patent 
applications, publications. Higher possible revenue or value of the outcomes is 
relatively irrelevant or even unwanted as that might cause bureaucratic 
procedures. Due to the low amount of funding the motivation of researchers tends 
to be related to being able to survive instead of creating an impact on the market. 
As a result, universities and other research organisations have so far 
focused on reaching the planned goals instead of motivating and creating 
entrepreneurial spirit among research groups. Incentives within universities 
should be implemented more to motivate researchers and students into solving 
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existing problems for the local market or encourage them to go international. 
Thus more funding for business incubators for technology-intensive companies 
should be planned together with university funded motivational incentives. 
Besides, more flexible understanding of technology transfer, including informal 
technology transfer through, for example, temporary employment of researchers 
by companies, should be encouraged. This, in combination with suitable financial 
incentives, could encourage creation of denser collaboration networks between 
industry and research institutions, potentially improving absorptive capacity of 
the former.   
In addition, to avoid unnecessary loss of funds, the requirements of the 
support incentives should be balanced with the time span and tailored according 
to the planned outputs, e.g. if a publicly tendered licence agreement is required at 
the end of the protect it should apply only to projects that are working on 
technologies with a higher technology readiness level (TRL) and that are e.g. 
patentable. A large part of research conducted in universities results in know-how 
and thus this kind of approach with licensing is not appropriate and often further 
work to ensure the sustainability and continuity of the research should be done. 
The current approach has created a number of useless patents and caused 
problems with licensing the know-how – universities have developed 
commercially viable know-how that has potential but still needs further work and 
companies are not willing to obtain the licences as for them it is too far from the 
market to be interesting. Many companies are also driven away by the public 
tender requirement as it causes issues with confidentiality. A better approach 
would be to offer funding in steps and to carefully determine the outcomes and 
TRL for each step. 
Governments use quantitative data on transfer cases or patent 
applications as indicators of how the national innovation system is improving and 
therefore applying this criterion is rather convenient. The increasing focus on 
various scoreboards and benchmarking is promoting this kind of approach in 
countries with a poor innovation performance. Meanwhile there are incentives 
like funding to establish collaboration platforms that instead does not focus on 
quantitative results but rather on continuous collaboration that expands beyond 
the initial aim, e.g.  information exchange platforms that expand into consortiums 
engaged in informal technology transfer activities.  
Tech transfer activities of universities rarely go beyond consultations 
and occasional contract research or joint projects funded by the ESIF - licensing 
and creation of spin-offs is rare. It is important to introduce new internal 
incentives at universities to promote entrepreneurial spirit among researchers and 
raise the awareness of the benefits of technology transfer. Some universities have 
already developed programmes that award researcher if they bring in a company 
or develop a commercially viable product, however, the impact of these activities 
is yet to be seen. 
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POTPORA TRANSFERU TEHNOLOGIJE NA 




Europske zemlje u okviru različitih razvojnih strategija već dulje vrijeme imaju 
cilj unaprjeđivanja suradnje između znanosti i industrije u svrhu jačanja svojih 
inovacijskih učinaka, dok je niz poticaja usmjeren na elemente nacionalnih 
inovacijskih sustava kako bi se olakšao transfer tehnologije na sveučilištima. Cilj 
ovog rada je raspraviti ove poticaje u Latviji – maloj tranzicijskoj zemlji s 
relativno skromnim inovacijskim učinkom i pod pritiskom oblikovanja svoje 
industrijske i istraživačke politike u smjeru industrijskog razvoja i održivog rasta. 
Latvija je zemlja koja se još uvijek oporavlja od nedavne financijske krize i 
pokušava nadići problem iz prošlosti kad je bila dio Sovjetskog saveza  (pozadina 
koja ima specifične karakteristike okoline u kojoj istraživači i tvrtke rade). Rad se 
usredotočuje na odabranu grupu politika i poticaja koji povezuju znanost i 
industriju u Latviji i način na koji se to uklapa u ekonomsku strukturu. Polazi se 
od pretpostavke da odabrani pristup (koji je često inspiriran pričama o uspjehu u 
inozemstvu) nije uspješan i dovodi do neslaganja ove dvije domene, te usporava 
napredovanje jer se ne bavi uzrocima slabe suradnje, poput niskog kapaciteta za 
apsorpciju inovacija u poslovnom sektoru koji bitno utječe na proces transfera 
tehnologije. Umjesto toga, ublažava simptome, npr. niske izdatke za istraživanje i 
razvoj (R&D). Istraživanje je provedeno kao analiza slučaja (case study) koja se 
oslanja na podatke prikupljene istraživanjem pisane dokumentacije i  razgovorom 
s ključnim kreatorima politike. 
Ključne riječi: Transfer tehnologije na sveučilištu, istraživačka i industrijska 
politika, apsorpcija inovacija, prijenos politike, propast politike 
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